A worked example
The brief Blockbuster never had
In September 2000, Netflix's founders flew to Dallas and offered to sell their company to Blockbuster for $50 million. Blockbuster said no, and history did the rest.
What follows is the brief that meeting never had: a reconstruction of how the deliberation might have gone if every stakeholder had been privately interviewed first. It is built on the public record and dramatized where the record is silent, with the seams marked in the notes at the end. From here, the brief speaks for itself.
Should Blockbuster acquire Netflix?
- Netflix has offered to sell itself for $50 million, with its team staying on to run Blockbuster's online rental business.1 Should Blockbuster accept, negotiate, or decline?
- If the answer is no, what is Blockbuster's own answer to rental-by-mail? Should it build, partner, or wait?
- How likely is DVD-by-mail to reach mainstream scale within five years?
The decision turns on what Netflix is: one more dot-com the crash will finish, or the business that replaces the store. The group divides about evenly on that,* and Netflix's own subscriber numbers could settle it, but nobody has asked for them. Whether $50 million is real money or a rounding error, and whether online rental defends the stores or bleeds them, are judgment calls for the chief executive and the board.
Agreed
- Netflix needs this deal more than Blockbuster does. It is unprofitable, it has about 292,000 subscribers,2 and it is trying to raise money in a hostile market. That is why the meeting exists.
- Blockbuster's engine is the store network, which brings in roughly $5 billion a year. About $800 million of that, 16 percent of revenue, comes from late fees.3
- DVD adoption is accelerating, and the shift away from VHS is no longer speculative.
- Nearly every online venture in America is losing money this September. The market has spent the summer repricing them.
- Blockbuster is not a free agent. It is majority-owned by Viacom, it was only recently part-floated, and it carries the debt that came with both.
Disputed
Is Netflix a bubble artifact, or the store's successor? This one could be settled with data: how often Netflix's subscribers actually rent, and how many are still around a year after signing up. Netflix has those numbers, and nobody has asked for them.*
- About half the group* holds that online rental is one more doomed dot-com. The "hysteria is completely overblown,"1 they say, and businesses like this will never make money. To this camp, Netflix's losses reveal what the model is.
- About half* hold that subscription-by-mail is a different animal: it charges no late fees, it carries an endless shelf, and it builds habits that compound. To this camp, the customer data reveals what the model is, and nobody at Blockbuster has seen it.
Is $50 million real money, or a rounding error? This one is a judgment call, and it belongs to the chief executive and the board.
- One camp argues that paying $50 million for an unprofitable startup, in the middle of a crash, is exactly the kind of bet the market has just spent six months punishing. The option to enter later stays open, at a price Blockbuster can always pay.
- The other camp argues that $50 million is one percent of annual revenue for the only working operator in the channel, which makes it insurance at the price of a rounding error. The option to enter later may not keep, and its price will not be Blockbuster's to set.
Does online rental defend the stores, or bleed them? This one is also a judgment call, about how much risk the company will carry, and it is the disagreement with the most voices missing from it.
- One camp argues that the late-fee line is load-bearing, and that a channel built on abolishing it amounts to the company attacking its own margin.
- The other camp argues that the $800 million is really a meter of customer resentment, and fuel for any competitor who promises never to charge it. On this reading, the late-fee line is a liability that has already started ticking.
Open questions
- What do Netflix's retention numbers actually show? The whole bubble-or-successor disagreement turns on this, the answer is sitting in Netflix's own records, and the request has never been made.*
- If this deal is declined, what is Blockbuster's own answer to late-fee resentment? Nobody has offered one.*
- What would turn the no into a yes? Nobody has said what would change their mind:* a subscriber threshold, a DVD-player price, or a retention number that would reopen the question. A decision without one cannot be revisited later. It can only be re-fought.
- Three groups have not been heard from:* the franchisees whose economics online rental would rewrite, the majority shareholder whose consent any strategy needs, and the store teams who hold the customer data. Their disagreements will arrive eventually, on their own schedule.
The group estimate
34 percent likely* that DVD-by-mail reaches five million US households by 2005.
The answers behind that number map almost exactly onto the bubble-or-successor question. People who think Netflix is a doomed dot-com sit low, and people who think it is the store's successor sit high.
Directions
These directions were drafted by Arterium from the synthesized deliberation.
A — Decline. This treats Netflix as a bubble, and it depends on subscription rental stalling without Blockbuster's help.
B — Acquire at $50 million. This is what Netflix has proposed.1 It treats the price as a rounding error, and it depends on the company stomaching an unprofitable subsidiary through the downturn.
C — Run a partner pilot. Netflix would operate blockbuster.com in test markets against agreed retention targets, with an option to acquire priced today. Instead of settling the bubble question by argument, this turns it into a measurement.
D — Build in-house, later. This treats the stores as a moat that can wait, and it depends on late entry being cheap.
What happened
Blockbuster chose to decline. Four years later it built the online business anyway, spending hundreds of millions of dollars, and by early 2007 its Total Access program was signing up subscribers faster than Netflix was.4 Along the way the company settled the late-fee argument the expensive way: abolishing them surrendered about $200 million a year, and the spending helped ignite Carl Icahn's proxy war.5 Then the strategy's sponsor lost a board fight over his pay and left the company.5 His successor, staring at heavy debt, an oncoming recession, and a board demanding profit, reversed course. In 2008 he told an interviewer that neither Netflix nor Redbox was "even on the radar screen in terms of competition. It's more Wal-Mart and Apple."6 Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy in September 2010.7 Netflix is now worth hundreds of billions of dollars.
The comfortable moral is that Blockbuster was blind. The record shows something stranger: the company saw the future, built it, and briefly ran it, but it could not hold a decision about it. The same three disagreements (bubble or successor, rounding error or real money, moat or self-harm) were re-fought for a decade, and each was settled only by paying its full price, because nobody ever wrote down what would settle it in advance. A better meeting in 2000 would not have guaranteed Blockbuster's survival. It would have told the company what it was betting, while the bet was still cheap.
The page history can't write
Everything real above comes from public statements, most of them made years later, once the outcome was safe to discuss. The version that mattered was internal: the franchisees, Viacom, the store teams, and the executive floor arguing these same questions among themselves, before the money moved. Nothing ever collected that version, and no historian can reconstruct it. A page like that has to be written before the meeting, and it is the page Arterium writes.
Your next contested decision has the same blanks in it. The difference is that yours can still be filled in.
Notes
* marks what we invented. The interviews themselves are the conceit, and the camp weights and estimate figures were made up for the demonstration. Everything else is sourced below.
- Marc Randolph, That Will Never Work (2019), is the sellers' account of the meeting, the $50 million ask, and the "completely overblown" exchange (book, excerpt).
- Netflix's IPO filing (2002) puts it at about 292,000 subscribers at the end of 2000.
- Blockbuster's late-fee economics in 2000, roughly $800 million and 16 percent of revenue, are widely reported; see Gina Keating, Netflixed (2012).
- CNBC, "How Netflix almost lost the movie rental wars" (2020).
- John Antioco, "How I Did It," Harvard Business Review (April 2011).
- James Keyes, Motley Fool interview, December 10, 2008.
- Blockbuster's Chapter 11 filing, September 2010.
- On the meeting itself, the record cannot even agree on who was in the room. The sellers describe suppressed laughter, while the buyer's side has never published an account of its own, and one writer who later asked Antioco reports that he remembers it differently, possibly as a brief stop into someone else's meeting. Five people sat in one room, and the record cannot agree on the cast list. That is rather the point.